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of an agency determination carries with it the right to intervene in the
proceeding on which the determination is based. But, unlike the former,
the latter right is not absolute once it attaches." Hopefully the courts will
continue to recognize this distinction as they are called upon to scrutinize
the intervention practices and procedures of administrative agencies. Such
a distinction is imperative lest the right to intervene become the right to
interfere.
Paul D. Schoonover
Summary Removal of Drugs from the Market: The Specter
of the Heavy Bureaucratic Hand
In 1966, the Drug Efficacy Study Group formed by the National Acade-
my of Sciences-National Research Council (NAS-NRC) commenced an
evaluation of all drugs on the market which had been certified as safe and
effective by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) between 1938
and 1962.' During the course of its investigations, the Study Group re-
ported to the Commissioner of the FDA that the Upjohn Company's
claims concerning the antibiotic drugs Panalba, Albamycin-T, and Alba-
mycin G.U. were unwarranted, that the drugs were ineffective, and that
no "well-controlled"' studies had been found to support Upjohn's claims.
Upjohn submitted testimonials of physicians and statistics on the wide-
spread use of the drugs to support its claims, but the Commissioner ruled
who might otherwise apply for intervention and serves to expedite the administrative process.'
429 F.2d at 739. The court further stated:
To the extent that appellees are apprehensive of chaos and confusion as an incident
to this enlarged right, we remind that they have already recognized the right of ap-
pellants to be present at the hearings and to be heard through counsel. Reliance for
proper control of the hearings and the orderly compilation of the hearing record
must, of course, be on the hearing examiner. He is fully authorized to be the arbiter
of the relevance of proffered testimony and of the proper scope of cross-examination,
and to insist that all parties address themselves to the business at hand with dignity
and dispatch.
Id. at 739 n.46.
5a See note 49 supra.
[M]any factors affect [the right of intervention] and not [the right to judicial
review]. . . . The central problem of intervention is usually the disadvantage to
the tribunal and to other parties of extended cross-examination; judicial review in-
volves no such problem. Adequate protection for interests obliquely affected may
often be afforded through limited participation; no such compromise concerning
judicial review is customary.
3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAw TREATISE S 22.08, at 241 (1958).
'In 1959, the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee
began a comprehensive investigation of the drug industry. This investigation resulted in the en-
actment of several amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 5§ 301-92
(1964). The sections amended in whole or in part in 1962 were: §§ 321, 331-32, 348, 351-53,
355, 357-58, 360, 372, 374, 376, and 381. To implement the 1962 amendments, the Food and
Drug Administration requested the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council
to establish a Drug Efficacy Study Group to review the claims of effectiveness of the estimated
4,000 drugs then certified. Notice of this agreement between the FDA and the NAS-NRC was
published in the Federal Register. 31 Fed. Reg. 9426 (1966).
"Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1964).
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such evidence insufficient to justify the granting of an evidentiary hear-
ing.S The denial of a hearing was based on the failure of Upjohn to pro-
duce "substantial evidence" of the effectiveness of the drugs as required
for retention of certification by 21 U.S.C. section 355 (e).' Finally, citing
the results of an additional report by the NAS-NRC Study Group which
further described the ineffectiveness and undesirable side effects of the
drugs, the Commissioner published an order revoking their certificates of
safety and effectiveness.' Before the order could become effective, Upjohn
obtained an injunction in a federal court, delaying enforcement of the order
until thirty days after the Commissioner took action on Upjohn's pending
motion for an evidentiary hearing." The Commissioner then published a
thorough review of the evidence submitted, again concluding that Upjohn
had failed to show grounds for an evidentiary hearing." A final order was
published on September 19, 1969, revoking the certificates of the drugs.'
Simultaneously, interpretive regulations describing the standards for the
granting of an evidentiary hearing and detailing the essentials of an "ade-
quate and well-controlled clinical investigation" were published.! Upjohn
appealed in accordance with 21 U.S.C. section 355(h). '" Held, affirmed:
The action of the Commissioner and the interpretive regulations correctly
reflect the intent of Congress that the "substantial evidence" standard of
21 U.S.C. section 355 (e) requires a genuine and substantial issue of fact
as a prerequisite to the granting of an evidentiary hearing. Upjohn Co. v.
Finch, 422 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1970).
I. HEARING BEFORE AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY WHEN NOT A
MATTER OF RIGHT
When a hearing before an administrative agency is not a matter of
right,1 a party seeking such a hearing must establish some valid basis for
a Simultaneously, the Commissioner published notice of his intent to withdraw certification
of the drugs. 33 Fed. Reg. 19203-04 (1968).
'Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1964).
534 Fed. Reg. 7687 (1969).
'Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
734 Fed. Reg. 12958-68 (1969).
834 Fed. Reg. 14598 (1969).
921 C.F.R. S 130.12 (Supp. 1970).
"
5 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(h) (1964).
" A hearing before an administrative agency is a right when required by statute or when the
action of the agency will deprive the claimant of "life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law" in violation of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution. In the absence of
statutory requirement, factors to be evaluated in determining whether a hearing is a matter of
right are: (1) the nature of the action of the administrative agency; (2) the nature of the interest
affected by agency action; (3) the availability of judicial review; and (4) the need for immediate
action. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Phillips
v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310 (1890).
Agency action may be characterized as either rule-making or adjudicatory. Rule-making action
is manifested in a rule or regulation which is general in application and future in effect, while
adjudicatory action is particular in application and immediate in effect. The particularity of focus
of adjudicatory action generally requires that a hearing be held prior to the taking of such action.
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 21.0, 226 (1908); Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d
808, 816 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot, 337 U.S. 901 (1949).
The interest affected by agency action may be either a right or a privilege. It is generally held
that due process standards do not apply if only a privilege is to be affected. Application of this
distinction depends upon the feasibility of characterizing an interest as either right or privilege.
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its request."' Generally, reasons advanced may not be "frivolous or incon-
sequential,"'" but must raise issues "material to the questions involved." '
Administrative agencies are not required to perform "useless or unfruit-
ful tasks.""s The public interest in the continued efficient functioning of the
agency is closely related to the requirement for legally sufficient grounds
for a hearing. Agencies will not grant individual hearings in numbers which
would seriously impair their work."0
There is dictum to the effect that a factor in the grant or denial of a
hearing should be the amount of power conferred upon the agency," and
that "fair play"'" or the acuteness of the effect on the interests involved"
should also be considerations. However, none of these essentially subjective
elements standing alone has ever been held to be sufficient to invalidate the
denial of a hearing. Similarly, the fact that conflicting evidence is pre-
sented is not decisive." On the other hand, the denial of a hearing has
been held to be error when the agency acted without explicit authoriza-
tion," took action which was clearly adjudicatory," or acted on the basis
of information which was secretly collected and not disclosed to the af-
fected party."
To delineate standards for the granting of a hearing, administrative
agencies promulgate interpretive regulations. These regulations are not
However, a clear distinction is not possible in many instances, for example, where the grant of a
license has led to substantial investment of money or other reliance which would be adversely
affected by summary agency action. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.20, at 143 (1959).
The availability of judicial review is a requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV, 1966), and has been held to exist even in the absence of specific statutory
authorization. Thus, statutes authorizing administrative agency action invariably include a specific
provision making judicial review available and specifying the procedures to be followed in obtain-
ing it. See, e.g., Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(h) (1964).
Immediate action by an administrative agency is occasionally necessary when an issue must be
resolved prior to a hearing or other formality. Summary action would be justified, for example,
when public health or welfare was at stake. See Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
1"United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956).




"I This rationale was employed in Air Line Pilot's Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.
1960), in which some 18,000 air line pilots were adversely affected by a regulation, adopted by
the Federal Aviation Agency without a hearing, requiring them to retire at age sixty. The Quesada
court stated: "Administrative regulations often limit in the public interest the use that persons
may make of their property without giving each one affected an opportunity to present evidence
upon the fairness of the regulation." Id. at 896.
'Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292, 304 (1937).
5 8Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1938); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Polt, 232
U.S. 165, 168 (1914).
"°National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 362 F.2d 946, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
"ICC v. Louisville & N. Ry., 227 U.S. 88 (1913); In re Electric Bond & Share Co., 95 F.
Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 950 (1951).
"tGreene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (Army-Navy-Air Force Personnel Security Board
revoked security clearance of employee of government contractor without explicit authorization
of either the President or Congress).
"See Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot, 337 U.S. 901
(1949); note 11 supra.
"^Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292 (1937) (PUC ordered Bell to refund excess earn-
ings to customers; Commission had determined excessiveness of earnings by its own evaluation of
the value of Bell's property and price trends and had not revealed this information to Bell);
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938) (Secretary of Agriculture established maximum rates
to be charged by stockyard commission men without a hearing and without revealing studies upon
which action was based).
NOTES
new law, since the power to make law may not be delegated by the legis-
lature,' but are merely statements as to what the head of the agency
thinks the law to be." Therefore, the regulations must be in harmony with
the statute they interpret, and must be reasonable." Although the agency's
interpretation of the law is not conclusive, it is entitled to the highest
respect," particularly if the statute involved is relatively new."
II. SECTIONS 3 5 5 (d) AND 3 5 5 (e) AND THE ASSOCIATED INTERPRETIVE
REGULATIONS
Sections 355 (d) and 355 (e)29 were enacted as part of the 1962 amend-
ments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act." Section 355 (e) describes
the procedures and standards for withdrawing the certification of drugs
previously certified by the FDA. It provides that certification may be with-
drawn "on the basis of new information .. .with respect to such drug,
evaluated together with evidence available ...when the application was
approved, that there is a lack of substantial evidence that the drug will
have the effect it purports or is represented to have . . . ."' "Substantial
evidence," as used in section 3 55 (e), is defined in section 3 5 5 (d) as "evi-
dence consisting of well-controlled investigations, including clinical in-
vestigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to
evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved . .. ."'
Section 3 55 (e) makes no clear statement as to the grounds for grant-
ing a hearing on de-certification of a drug; it simply provides that after
"notice and opportunity for a hearing"3 the Secretary may withdraw
certification of a drug if there is a lack of "substantial evidence" as to
its effectiveness. The standards for the grant of a hearing under section
35 5 (e) are contained in the interpretive regulations issued by the Commis-
sioner on September 19, 1969."' These regulations state that an applicant
must submit "a well-organized and full factual analysis of the clinical
and other investigational data he is prepared to prove .... A request for a
'4Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) ("The Congress is
not permitted to abdicate or transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is
thus vested.").
SR.H. Macy & Co. v. United States, 255 F.2d 884 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880
(1958).
"
5Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953).
" International Chem. Workers Union v. Planters Mfg. Co., 259 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Miss.
1966).
21McLeod v. AFTRA, 234 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 351 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1965)
(per curiam).
"Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(d), (e) (1964).
a'21 U.S.C. § 301-92 (1964); see note 1 supra.
1' Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. S 355(e) (1964).
32Id. § 355(d).
33 Id.
'421 C.F.R. § 130.12, 130.14, 130.27, 130.31, and 146.1 (Supp. 1970). In Pharmaceutical
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970), these regulations were declared invalid be-
cause of the failure of the Commissioner to provide notice and opportunity to comment in ac-
cordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. IV, 1966). The Com-
missioner immediately proposed to re-promulgate the regulations after complying with the re-
quirement for notice and opportunity to comment. 35 Fed. Reg. 3073 (1970). The regulations




hearing may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine and substantial issue of fact
that requires a hearing.""5 In the absence of a "genuine and substantial
issue of fact," the Commissioner is authorized to make findings on the
basis of the data submitted, without holding a hearing. The interpretive
regulations also describe the essentials of a clinical study, detailing such
provisions as selection of subjects, comparison of test and control groups,
placebo control, and standardization. It is specifically stated that "un-
controlled studies or partially controlled studies are not acceptable evi-
dence to support claims of effectiveness."' The requirement of section
355 (e) that a manufacturer demonstrate the effectiveness of his product
by "substantial evidence" is thus defined by section 355 (d) and the in-
terpretive regulations as a requirement that the manufacturer raise "a
genuine and substantial issue of fact" by means of clinical studies as a pre-
requisite to the grant of an evidentiary hearing on the effectiveness of the
drug.
III. UPJOHN Co. v. FINCH
Upjohn attacked the application of the "substantial evidence" standard
by claiming that: (1) the FDA could not apply it because there was no
new information or evidence establishing the ineffectiveness of the drugs
involved; (2) the standard was only applicable to drugs which had been
certified after 1962; and (3) even if the standard were applicable, the
testimonials and statistics submitted by Upjohn established its claims by
"substantial evidence." The court held, with little substantive discussion,
that the FDA's new information, collected after 1962, was sufficient to
establish that the drugs involved were ineffective. The court then construed
the applicability of section 355 (e) in the broadest sense, holding that it ap-
plied to drugs certified before, as well as after, 1962, and that information
acquired subsequent to certification could be used in evaluating the ef-
fectiveness of the drug.a" The court agreed with the Commissioner that the
evidence submitted by Upjohn, consisting of testimonials of physicians and
statistics on the widespread use and prior certification of the drug, was
not sufficient to meet the "substantial evidence" test. The popularity of
the drugs was accounted for in an extended polemic against the advertis-
ing practices of the drug industry. The court also held that the interpre-
tative regulations of the FDA, defining the "substantial evidence" test
of section 355 (e) in terms of a "genuine and substantial issue of fact," cor-
rectly reflected the intent of Congress."s
'521 C.F.R. § 130.14 (Supp. 1970).
3821 C.F.R. § 130.12(7)(c) (Supp. 1970).
"'The court cited the policy considerations enunciated in Bell v. Goddard, 366 F.2d 177 (7th
Cir. 1966). In Bell the court had noted that the FDA study "drew together clinical experience
in a manner not previously attempted," and to prevent the application of this new information
because it was assimilated subsequent to certification "would do violence to the paramount interest
in protecting the public from unsafe drugs." Id. at 181.
"' Senator Kefauver was quoted: "This section 355(d) would require . . . a showing by sub-
stantial evidence, by experts who are experienced in making investigations of the drug involved,
that the drug not only will be safe but also will have the effect it purports or is represented to
[Vol 24
Upjohn also alleged that it would suffer irreparable injury as a result
of de-certification. The company noted that over 750 million doses of
these drugs had been prescribed since 1957, and that they accounted for
twelve per cent of the company's business, or $30 million per year. The
court did not discuss the implied contention that the substantial invest-
ment of Upjohn in the manufacture of these drugs rendered the retention
of their certification more in the nature of a vested right than a privilege."
The logic of this contention is appealing, but it is squarely opposed by the
nature and purpose of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Considering the
pervasive provisions of the Act for the evaluation and licensing of drugs,
it cannot be said that Upjohn has a right to market them, or that the
company has a right to compensation after being forced to withdraw
them from the market. The most that can be said is that Upjohn has a
privilege without protection beyond the normal standards of administrative
due process.
Filing a brief as amicus curiae, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers As-
sociation 0 contended that Congress did not intend that the 1962 amend-
ments be applied to drugs certified prior to 1962, and that the NAS-NRC
panels did not apply the same standards demanded of manufacturers in
making the determination that the drugs were ineffective.4 ' The first of
these contentions was refuted by the court by its broad construction of
section 355 (e). The second contention, however, is the strongest in favor
of the drug industry. The court stated only that the Commissioner had
before him "the unanimous conclusion of thirty experts in antimicrobial
therapy" that the drugs were ineffective." No mention is made of a clinical
study on the part of the Study Group, and analysis of the composition and
procedures of the panels indicates that there was substantial reliance upon
personal experience and opinions.Y The Group had reviewed some 2,800
drugs as of February 1970; individual attention in the form of a clinical
have." 108 Cong. Rcc. 16,307 (daily ed. Aug. 23, 1962) (remarks of Senator Kefauver, member
of the Judiciary Committee).
39 See note 10 supra.
4The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association is a non-profit Delaware corporation com-
posed of some 130 drug companies, which account for approximately 90% of drugs manufactured
and distributed in interstate commerce. Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858,
859 n.1 (D. Del. 1970).
41Whyte, Effectiveness of the NAS-NRC Drug Effectiveness Review, 25 FooD DRuG CosM.
L.J. 91 (1970). See also Kleinfeld, Reasonable Grounds, Substantial Evidence, and Law and Order,
25 FoOD DRuG COSM. L.J. 210 (1970).4
aUpjohn Co. v. Finch, 422 F.2d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 1970).
4' The effectiveness evaluations were performed by twenty-seven panels, with six mem-
bers each. Individual drugs were assigned to the various panels on the basis of
therapeutic groupings. The members of the panels were selected by the Policy Com-
mittee of the study in consultation with the chairmen of the individual panels.
The panels were instructed to make the following judgments on the indications set
forth for a drug in its labeling-effective; probably effective; possibly effective; or
ineffective . . . . The panels were to base their judgments on factual information
available in the scientific literature; factual information available from the FDA,
the manufacturer or other sources; or on the experience and informed judgment of
the members of the panel .... In all, 237 firms submitted material on 2,824
drug preparations.




study for each one was a practical impossibility." The operating guidelines
for the Study Group do not require a clinical study to be made.' Thus, the
FDA has based its action upon the opinions of experts, a type of evidence
deemed insufficient when proferred by the manufacturer.
IV. CONCLUSION
Upjobn makes clear that the "substantial evidence" test of section
355 (e) will be applied to all drugs considered for de-certification. This
will include drugs certified before and after 1962, and evidence acquired
after 1962 may be used in making a determination of the efficacy of a
particular drug. The most serious impact of Upjohn, however, is that a
given drug may be removed from the market by summary action of the
Commissioner of the FDA if the "substantial evidence" test is not met.
This action will be taken without regard for the financial interest of the
manufacturer in the production of the drug. While Upjohn represents the
most oppressive fact situation yet found in terms of the amount of money
involved, it is not difficult to imagine situations of even greater financial
magnitude in which the FDA could take summary action. Section 3 5 5 (e)
places the burden of proof squarely on the manufacturer, but the wide
disparity in standards of proof, coupled with the substantial economic
effect on Upjohn, must give rise to concern. These factors would seem to
indicate that something more than summary action is called for. Upjohn
states that they do not. Thus, although a dormant power of the FDA has
been realized and used successfully, the limits of this power remain un-
defined.
Charles H. Waters, Jr.
44 Id.
" Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 865 (D. Del. 1970); Upjohn Co.
v. Finch, 303 F. Supp. 241, 259-60 (W.D. Mich. 1970).
[Vol. 24
